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Demand and supply
Demand models
Supply = infrastructure
Demand = behavior, choices
Congestion = mismatch
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Demand and supply
Demand models
Usually in OR:
optimization of the supply
for a given (fixed) demand
Michel Bierlaire (EPFL) Choice models and optimization November 19, 2017 4 / 66
Demand and supply
Aggregate demand
Homogeneous population
Identical behavior
Price (P) and quantity (Q)
Demand functions: P = f (Q)
Inverse demand: Q = f −1(P)
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Demand and supply
Disaggregate demand
Heterogeneous population
Different behaviors
Many variables:
Attributes: price, travel time,
reliability, frequency, etc.
Characteristics: age, income,
education, etc.
Complex demand/inverse
demand functions.
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Demand and supply
Demand-supply interactions
Operations Research
Given the demand...
configure the system
Behavioral models
Given the configuration of
the system...
predict the demand
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Demand and supply
Demand-supply interactions
Multi-objective optimization
Minimize costs Maximize satisfaction
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Disaggregate demand models
Choice models
Behavioral models
Demand = sequence of choices
Choosing means trade-offs
In practice: derive trade-offs
from choice models
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Disaggregate demand models
Choice models
Theoretical foundations
Random utility theory
Choice set: Cn
yin = 1 if i ∈ Cn, 0 if not
Logit model:
P(i |Cn) = yine
Vin∑
j∈C yjne
Vjn
2000
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Disaggregate demand models
Logit model
Utility
Uin = Vin + εin
Choice probability
Pn(i |Cn) = yine
Vin∑
j∈C yjne
Vjn
.
Decision-maker n
Alternative i ∈ Cn
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Disaggregate demand models
Variables: xin = (pin, zin, sn)
Attributes of alternative i : zin
Cost / price (pin)
Travel time
Waiting time
Level of comfort
Number of transfers
Late/early arrival
etc.
Characteristics of decision-maker n:
sn
Income
Age
Sex
Trip purpose
Car ownership
Education
Profession
etc.
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Disaggregate demand models
Demand curve
Disaggregate model
Pn(i |pin, zin, sn)
Total demand
D(i) =
∑
n
Pn(i |pin, zin, sn)
Difficulty
Non linear and non convex in pin and zin
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Literature
Stochastic traffic assignment
Features
Nash equilibrium
Flow problem
Demand: path choice
Supply: capacity
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Literature
Selected literature
[Dial, 1971]: logit
[Daganzo and Sheffi, 1977]: probit
[Fisk, 1980]: logit
[Bekhor and Prashker, 2001]: cross-nested logit
and many others...
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Literature
Revenue management
Features
Stackelberg game
Bi-level optimization
Demand: purchase
Supply: price and capacity
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Literature
Selected literature
[Labbe´ et al., 1998]: bi-level programming
[Andersson, 1998]: choice-based RM
[Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004]: choice-based RM
[Gilbert et al., 2014a]: logit
[Gilbert et al., 2014b]: mixed logit
[Azadeh et al., 2015]: global optimization
and many others...
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Literature
Facility location problem
Features
Competitive market
Opening a facility impact the costs
Opening a facility impact the demand
Decision variables: availability of the
alternatives
Pn(i |Cn) = yine
Vin∑
j∈C yjne
Vjn
.
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Literature
Selected literature
[Hakimi, 1990]: competitive location (heuristics)
[Benati, 1999]: competitive location (B & B, Lagrangian relaxation,
submodularity)
[Serra and Colome´, 2001]: competitive location (heuristics)
[Marianov et al., 2008]: competitive location (heuristic)
[Haase and Mu¨ller, 2013]: school location (simulation-based)
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A generic framework
A linear formulation
Utility function
Uin = Vin + εin =
∑
k
βkxink + f (zin) + εin.
Simulation
Assume a distribution for εin
E.g. logit: i.i.d. extreme value
Draw R realizations ξinr ,
r = 1, . . . ,R
The choice problem becomes
deterministic
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A generic framework
Scenarios
Draws
Draw R realizations ξinr , r = 1, . . . ,R
We obtain R scenarios
Uinr =
∑
k
βkxink + f (zin) + ξinr .
For each scenario r , we can identify the largest utility.
It corresponds to the chosen alternative.
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A generic framework
Capacities
Demand may exceed supply
Each alternative i can be
chosen by maximum ci
individuals.
An exogenous priority list is
available.
The numbering of individuals is
consistent with their priority.
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A generic framework
Priority list
Application dependent
First in, first out
Frequent travelers
Subscribers
...
In this framework
The list of customers must be sorted
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A generic framework
References
Technical report: [Bierlaire and Azadeh, 2016]
TRISTAN presentation: [Pacheco et al., 2016]
STRC proceeeding: [Pacheco et al., 2017]
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A generic framework
Demand model
Population of N customers (n)
Choice set C (i)
Cn ⊆ C: alternatives considered by customer n
Behavioral assumption
Uin = Vin + εin
Vin =
∑
k βinkx
e
ink + q
d(xd)
Pn(i |Cn) = Pr(Uin ≥ Ujn, ∀j ∈ Cn)
Simulation
Distribution εin
R draws ξin1, . . . , ξinR
Uinr = Vin + ξinr
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A generic framework
Supply model
Operator selling services to a market
Price pin (to be decided)
Capacity ci
Benefit (revenue− cost) to be maximized
Opt-out option (i = 0)
Price characterization
Continuous: lower and
upper bound
Discrete: price levels
Capacity allocation
Exogenous priority list of customers
Assumed given
Capacity as decision variable
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A generic framework
MILP (in words)
MILP
max benefit
subject to utility definition
availability
discounted utility
choice
capacity allocation
price selection
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A simple example
A simple example
Context
C: set of movies
Population of N individuals
Competition: staying home
watching TV
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A simple example Example: one theater
One theater – homogenous population
Alternatives
Staying home: Ucn = 0 + εcn
My theater: Umn = −10.0pm + 3 + εmn
Logit model
εm i.i.d. EV(0,1)
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A simple example Example: one theater
Demand and revenues
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A simple example Example: one theater
Optimization
Solver
GLPK v4.61 under PyMathProg
Data
N = 1
R = 1000
Results
Optimum price: 0.276
Demand: 57.4%
Revenues: 0.159
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A simple example Example: one theater
Demand and revenues
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
D
em
an
d
R
ev
en
u
es
Price
Revenues
Demand
Michel Bierlaire (EPFL) Choice models and optimization November 19, 2017 36 / 66
A simple example Example: one theater
Heterogeneous population
Two groups in the population
Umn = −βnpm + cn
Young fans: 2/3
β1 = −10, c1 = 3
Others: 1/3
β2 = −0.9, c2 = 0
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A simple example Example: one theater
Demand and revenues
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A simple example Example: one theater
Optimization
Data
N = 3
R = 500
Results
Optimum price: 0.297
Customer 1 (fan): 52.4%
[theory: 50.8 %]
Customer 2 (fan) : 49%
[theory: 50.8 %]
Customer 3 (other) : 45.8%
[theory: 43.4 %]
Demand: 1.472 (49%)
Revenues: 0.437
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A simple example Example: one theater
Demand and revenues
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A simple example Example: two theaters
Two theaters, different types of films
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A simple example Example: two theaters
Two theaters, different types of films
Theater m
Attractive for young people
Star Wars Episode VII
Theater k
Not particularly attractive for
young people
Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy
Heterogeneous demand
Two third of the population is young (price sensitive)
One third of the population is not (less price sensitive)
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A simple example Example: two theaters
Two theaters, different types of films
Data
Theaters m and k
N = 9
R = 50
Umn = −10pm + 4 , n =young
Umn = −0.9pm, n =others
Ukn = −10pk + 0 , n =young
Ukn = −0.9pk , n =others
Theater m
Optimum price m: 0.390
Young customers: 3.48 / 6
Other customers: 1.08 / 3
Demand: 4.56 (50.7%)
Revenues: 1.779
Theater k
Optimum price k: 1.728
Young customers: 0.0 / 6
Other customers: 0.38 / 3
Demand: 0.38 (4.2%)
Revenues: 0.581
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A simple example Example: two theaters
Two theaters, same type of films
Theater m
Expensive
Star Wars Episode VII
Theater k
Cheap (half price)
Star Wars Episode VIII
Heterogeneous demand
Two third of the population is young (price sensitive)
One third of the population is not (less price sensitive)
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A simple example Example: two theaters
Two theaters, same type of films
Data
Theaters m and k
N = 9
R = 50
Umn = −10p + 4 , n =young
Umn = −0.9p, n =others
Ukn = −10p/2 + 4 , n =young
Ukn = −0.9p/2, n =others
Theater m
Optimum price m: 3.582
Young customers: 0
Other customers: 1.9
Demand: 1.9 (31.7%)
Revenues: 3.42
Theater k
Closed
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Case study
Challenge
Select a real choice model from
the literature
Integrate it in an optimization
problem.
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Case study
Parking choices
N = 50 customers
C = {PSP,PUP,FSP}
Cn = C ∀n
PSP: 0.50, 0.51, . . . , 0.65 (16 price levels)
PUP: 0.70, 0.71, . . . , 0.85 (16 price levels)
Capacity of 20 spots
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Case study
Choice model: mixtures of logit model [Ibeas et al., 2014]
VFSP = βAT ATFSP + βTD TDFSP + βOriginINT FSP OriginINT FSP
VPSP = ASCPSP + βAT ATPSP + βTD TDPSP + βFEE FEEPSP
+ βFEEPSP(LowInc) FEEPSPLowInc + βFEEPSP(Res) FEEPSPRes
VPUP = ASCPUP + βAT ATPUP + βTD TDPUP + βFEE FEEPUP
+ βFEEPUP(LowInc) FEEPUPLowInc + βFEEPUP(Res) FEEPUPRes
+ βAgeVeh≤3 AgeVeh≤3
Parameters
Circle: distributed parameters
Rectangle: constant parameters
Variables: all given but FEE (in bold)
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Case study
Experiment 1: uncapacitated vs capacitated case (1)
Capacity constraints are ignored
Unlimited capacity is assumed
20 spots for PSP and PUP
Free street parking (FSP) has
unlimited capacity
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Case study
Experiment 1: uncapacitated vs capacitated case (2)
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Case study
Experiment 1: uncapacitated vs capacitated case (3)
Uncapacitated
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Case study
Experiment 2: price differentiation by segmentation (1)
Discount offered to residents
Two scenarios (municipality)
1 Subsidy offered by the municipality
2 Operator obliged to offer reduced fees
We expect the price to increase
PSP: {0.60, 0.64, . . . , 1.20}
PUP: {0.80, 0.84, . . . , 1.40}
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Case study
Experiment 2: price differentiation by segmentation (2)
Scenario 1
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Case study
Experiment 2: price differentiation by segmentation (3)
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Case study
Other experiments
Impact of the priority list
Priority list = order of the individuals in the data (i.e., random arrival)
100 different priority lists
Aggregate indicators remain stable across random priority lists
Benefit maximization through capacity allocation
4 different capacity levels for both PSP and PUP: 5, 10, 15 and 20
Optimal solution: PSP with 20 spots and PUP is not offered
Both services have to be offered: PSP with 15 and PUP with 5
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Conclusion
Summary
Demand and supply
Supply: prices and capacity
Demand: choice of customers
Interaction between the two
Discrete choice models
Rich family of behavioral models
Strong theoretical foundations
Great deal of concrete applications
Capture the heterogeneity of behavior
Probabilistic models
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Conclusion
Optimization
Discrete choice models
Non linear and non convex
Idea: use utility instead of probability
Rely on simulation to capture stochasticity
Proposed formulation
Linear in the decision variables
Large scale
Fairly general
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Conclusion
Ongoing research
Decomposition methods
Scenarios are (almost) independent from each other (except objective
function)
Individuals are also loosely coupled (except for capacity constraints)
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Conclusion
Bibliography I
Andersson, S.-E. (1998).
Passenger choice analysis for seat capacity control: A pilot project in
scandinavian airlines.
International Transactions in Operational Research, 5(6):471–486.
Azadeh, S. S., Marcotte, P., and Savard, G. (2015).
A non-parametric approach to demand forecasting in revenue
management.
Computers & Operations Research, 63:23–31.
Bekhor, S. and Prashker, J. (2001).
Stochastic user equilibrium formulation for generalized nested logit
model.
Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation
Research Board, (1752):84–90.
Michel Bierlaire (EPFL) Choice models and optimization November 19, 2017 61 / 66
Conclusion
Bibliography II
Benati, S. (1999).
The maximum capture problem with heterogeneous customers.
Computers & operations research, 26(14):1351–1367.
Bierlaire, M. and Azadeh, S. S. (2016).
Demand-based discrete optimization.
Technical Report 160209, Transport and Mobility Laboratory, Ecole
Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne.
Daganzo, C. F. and Sheffi, Y. (1977).
On stochastic models of traffic assignment.
Transportation science, 11(3):253–274.
Michel Bierlaire (EPFL) Choice models and optimization November 19, 2017 62 / 66
Conclusion
Bibliography III
Dial, R. B. (1971).
A probabilistic multipath traffic assignment model which obviates path
enumeration.
Transportation research, 5(2):83–111.
Fisk, C. (1980).
Some developments in equilibrium traffic assignment.
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 14(3):243–255.
Gilbert, F., Marcotte, P., and Savard, G. (2014a).
Logit network pricing.
Computers & Operations Research, 41:291–298.
Gilbert, F., Marcotte, P., and Savard, G. (2014b).
Mixed-logit network pricing.
Computational Optimization and Applications, 57(1):105–127.
Michel Bierlaire (EPFL) Choice models and optimization November 19, 2017 63 / 66
Conclusion
Bibliography IV
Haase, K. and Mu¨ller, S. (2013).
Management of school locations allowing for free school choice.
Omega, 41(5):847–855.
Hakimi, S. L. (1990).
Locations with spatial interactions: competitive locations and games.
Discrete location theory, pages 439–478.
Ibeas, A., dell’Olio, L., Bordagaray, M., and de D. OrtA˜ozar, J.
(2014).
Modelling parking choices considering user heterogeneity.
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 70:41 – 49.
Michel Bierlaire (EPFL) Choice models and optimization November 19, 2017 64 / 66
Conclusion
Bibliography V
Labbe´, M., Marcotte, P., and Savard, G. (1998).
A bilevel model of taxation and its application to optimal highway
pricing.
Management science, 44(12-part-1):1608–1622.
Marianov, V., R´ıos, M., and Icaza, M. J. (2008).
Facility location for market capture when users rank facilities by
shorter travel and waiting times.
European Journal of Operational Research, 191(1):32–44.
Pacheco, M., Azadeh, S. S., Bierlaire, M., and Gendron, B. (2017).
Integrating advanced demand models within the framework of mixed
integer linear problems: A lagrangian relaxation method for the
uncapacitated case.
In Proceedings of the 17th Swiss Transport Research Conference,
Ascona, Switzerland.
Michel Bierlaire (EPFL) Choice models and optimization November 19, 2017 65 / 66
Conclusion
Bibliography VI
Pacheco, M., Bierlaire, M., and Azadeh, S. S. (2016).
Incorporating advanced behavioral models in mixed linear
optimization.
Presented at TRISTAN IX, Oranjestad, Aruba.
Serra, D. and Colome´, R. (2001).
Consumer choice and optimal locations models: formulations and
heuristics.
Papers in Regional Science, 80(4):439–464.
Talluri, K. and Van Ryzin, G. (2004).
Revenue management under a general discrete choice model of
consumer behavior.
Management Science, 50(1):15–33.
Michel Bierlaire (EPFL) Choice models and optimization November 19, 2017 66 / 66
